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AN INFORMAL WORLD: THE ROLE AND STATUS OF “CONTACT 




“I should never mistake informality for insolence. One, I 
rather like; the other, no free-born person would submit to, 
even for a salary.” 




This article examines the role and status of the so-called “Contact Group” under 
present-day International Law. An alternative policy invention designed to intervene in 
traditional conflict prevention, mediation, and settlement, the Group’s configuration 
reflects a representation of the world’s major powers that both share and project strategic 
spheres of influence in particular countries or regions and play key roles in global 
governance. In all cases so far, permanent members of United Nations Security Council 
were at the forefront of the Contact Group. At the operational level, the Group partially 
acts as a de facto executive body, such as the Security Council, or at least performs 
functions similar to those of the Security Council. Such actions may be authorized by the 
Council,1 either explicitly or implicitly, or not authorized at all, and thus the Group acts, 
at least ab initio, without any formal authorization or legitimization.2 In this latter case, 
however, there has always been ex post facto approval of the Contact Group’s actions, 
due in large part to the fact that those actions were undertaken by a majority of the 
                                                 
 I wish to acknowledge the support of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
International Law in Heidelberg, Germany.  
1 The operation of the Group in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina may be considered of such a 
nature.  See discussion infra Part III. 
2 This is the case with initial involvement of the Group in Namibia. See discussion infra Part II. 
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Security Council’s permanent members. Furthermore, on various occasions, the Group 
seems to have even acted on behalf of the Security Council;3 though this relationship, as 
the following discussion will show, is at best described as being complementary.4  
In fact, it is the lack of a more active, cohesive, coordinated, and effective UN 
collective security system that provides the primary justification for the existence of such 
an informal ad hoc grouping of states. It thus may make sense to link the Group’s 
emergence to the lack of more coordinated and effective global diplomatic efforts in the 
areas of conflict prevention, mediation, and settlement.   
For the first time under this name, the Contact Group declared its existence on 
April 10, 1978, as a facilitating mechanism to Namibian independence, in response to 
South Africa’s continued military occupation of Namibia. It emerged against a backdrop 
of largely unsuccessful UN led negotiations to bring about a solution to the Namibian 
question. This Group consisted of five Western nations: Canada, France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany; all members of the Security Council at 
that time. 
Another Contact Group emerged after the European Union (EU), the UN, and the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) failed to bring 
about a solution to the Bosnian conflict. This Group was formed in April 1994 and was 
composed of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States; four of them being permanent members of the Security Council.  
With the escalation of violence in Kosovo in 1998, this Contact Group came once 
again onto the scene with Italy becoming a member of the Group. Currently the Group is 
playing a leading role in the process of finding a settlement to the issue of Kosovo’s 
political status. In November 2005, the Group established its own Guiding Principles for 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., The Guiding Principles of the Contact Group for a Settlement of the Status of Kosovo, 
in Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
S/2005/709 (Nov. 10, 2005), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/597/68/PDF/N0559768.pdf?OpenElement (last visited 
April 24, 2007) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].  
4 See, e.g., Kosovo Contact Group Ministerial Statement (September 20, 2006), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/72892.htm (last visited April 24, 2007) (recalling that “[t]he Security 
Council and the Contact Group will continue to play key roles”). 
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a settlement of the status of Kosovo. These principles provide that all involved parties 
should respect the process of finding a political settlement.5 The Guiding Principles were 
circulated as a Security Council document,6 as was the case with the Contact Group’s 
proposal of April 10, 1978 for Namibia.7 A number of other meetings of the Contact 
Group on Kosovo have provided further clarification of its own positions regarding the 
status issue8 and have also demanded that the parties involved take concrete actions in 
the process.9   
                                                 
5 See Guiding Principles, supra note 3 (providing “[t]he Contact Group … informs all the involved 
parties that the outcome of the Status process should be based on the principles set out below…”). 
6 See id.  
7 S.C. Res. 431, U.N. Doc. S/RES/431 (July 27, 1978).   
8 See, e.g., Kosovo Contact Group Ministerial Statement, supra note 4 (stating, inter alia, 
“[M]inisters support the Special Envoy’s efforts to work with the parties in cooperation with the Contact 
Group to arrive at a realistic outcome that enhances regional stability, is acceptable to the people of Kosovo 
and preserves Kosovo’s multi-ethnic character.”); Contact Group Statement, Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs, High-Level Meeting on the Future Status of Kosovo (July 24, 2006), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69376.htm (last visited April 24, 2007) (providing, in relevant part, “[t]he 
Contact Group reaffirms that all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement in the 
course of 2006 that is, inter alia, acceptable to the people of Kosovo and promotes a multi-ethnic society 
with a future for all of its citizens”). 
9 See, e.g., Contact Group Ministers’ Statement of 31 January 2006, Kosovo Contact Group 
Statement (Jan. 31, 2006),  http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/88236.pdf 
(stating in relevant parts, “[t]he Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, alongside all communities in 
Kosovo, must do much more to ensure that the UN Security Council-endorsed Standards are implemented. 
… Ministers look to Belgrade to bear in mind that the settlement needs, inter alia, to be acceptable to the 
people of Kosovo. … Ministers equally urge Pristina to recognise that a multi-ethnic settlement is the only 
workable option and that the more the vital interests of minorities are addressed the quicker a broadly 
acceptable agreement can be reached.”).   
See also Contact Group Meeting on Kosovo (Sept. 20, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/54040.htm; Contact Group Plus Statement (Feb. 2, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/41481.htm; Contact Group Statement (Dec. 16, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/40038.htm; Contact Group Chairman’s Statement (Sept. 28, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/37536.htm; Contact Group Statement (Sept. 3, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/37533.htm; Contact Group Plus Meeting Press Statement (July 20, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/37531.htm; Conclusions of the Contact Group Meeting with the 
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Considering the Group’s considerable powers and its growing involvement in 
conflict mediation and resolution, this article seeks to give an appraisal of the legal 
sources under which the Contact Group operates. It also strives to expose and examine 
the cases in which the Group has been involved, discuss its role and functions in those 
cases, and finally draw certain conclusions and recommendations for the global common 
interest. Part I considers the legal sources upon which the Group bases its authority. Part 
II examines the Group’s justification for its involvement in the case of Namibia (formerly 
South West Africa) and the result of its actions. The conditioning factors leading to the 
formation of Contact Group also form part of this discussion. Part III concerns the role 
the Group played in bringing a peaceful settlement to the Bosnian conflict, and Part IV 
discusses the involvement of the Group in the process of finding a political settlement to 
the yet unresolved Kosovo status issue, beginning with the pre-Rambouillet peace talks 
and continuing through the recent process of negotiations. Finally, Part V contains 
general prescriptive content built upon substantive issues discussed in the rest of the 
article.  
 
I. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CONTACT GROUP OPERATION  
  
Given its nature and modus operandi, the principal question of inquiry into the 
Group’s operation in external arenas is its relationship vis-à-vis international legal 
authority and the formal UN structures.  
Although member states of the Contact Group are at the same time members of 
the UN, they do not necessarily act as a UN structure, but rather on behalf of their own 
governments. An exception exists in cases where there is explicit authorization and 
recognition of the Group by the UN Security Council in matters concerning  international 
peace and security.  
Additionally, a more explicit basis can be found in the UN Charter. The Group 
may claim its authority is derived from Article 35 of the Charter, which provides that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (June 8, 2004), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/37530.htm; 
Joint Statement of the Contact Group on Kosovo (Apr. 20, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/37539.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
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“[a]ny Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the 
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General 
Assembly.”10 The disputes or situations referred to in Article 34 are of the nature that 
present, can likely endanger, or constitute potential threats to international peace and 
security.11 However, any determination of such a threat or potential threat is within the 
ambit of the Security Council’s powers.  
Speaking about the Namibian case, Professor Richardson observes that the 
Contact Group’s intention “appears to have been to act as individual governments 
fortuitously engaged in a joint endeavor, with their authority deriving from the validity of 
each government’s acting as a member of the Security Council, whether under Article 34 
of the Charter, or under more general notions of the authority of Security Council 
members.”12 In fact, Article 34 of the Charter does not authorize any individual member 
state to act per se in such circumstances; the wording of Article 34 merely suggests that 
UN Member States are authorized to bring any dispute or situation posing a threat to 
international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. In this sense, the 
legitimacy of the Contact Group is or, rather, should be grounded on explicit approval, 
authorization, and recognition by various Security Council resolutions.  
Other sources of authority may be found in the flexibility and plurality of the UN 
Charter itself. The Charter allows for the utilization of certain ad hoc regional or 
international arrangements to perform complementary functions on behalf of the UN. In 
spite of its relatively precise allocation of responsibilities to a number of organs, the 
Charter of the United Nations leaves room for innovative alternative or complementary 
functions to be exercised by regional or international arrangements. Such flexibility 
                                                 
10 U.N. Charter art. 35, para. 1.  
11 U.N. Charter art. 34. 
12 See Henry J. Richardson, Constitutive Questions in the Negotiations for Namibian 
Independence, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 84 (1984).  On the Contact Group’s role in negotiations for 
Namibia’s independence, see generally Elizabeth Landis, The Never-Ending Namibian Negotiations, in 
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL AND RIGHTS UNDER LAW, A SPECIAL REPORT: SOUTHERN AFRICA (1982);  
ELIZABETH LANDIS, NAMIBIAN LIBERATION: SELF-DETERMINATION, LAW AND POLITICS (Episcopal 
Churchmen for South Africa, 1982);  R.H.F. Austin, Namibia and Zimbabwe, 35 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 
203 (1982). 
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allows states to resort to regional alliances or coalitions that use military force on behalf 
of the United Nations, provide peacekeeping troops that serve under the authority of the 
United Nations, or perform such functions as deemed necessary to achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes.13  
Under a more expansive reading of Charter provisions, though still carefully and 
contextually analyzed, one could argue for an informal ad hoc grouping of states as a 
supplementary instrument of collective security, provided that such an informal grouping 
of states (acquiring much of its authority from provisions of the Charter which grant such 
authority to UN member states and to regional or other international arrangements) 
behave in accordance with and serve the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and communicate its 
activities to or perform its activities in consultation with the relevant UN organs. Various 
provisions of the Charter provide support for such an informal grouping of states.  “All 
Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in 
accordance with the present Charter …”14 and shall “contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security”15 by undertaking “to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance, and facilities . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security,”16 Moreover, all members shall keep the Security Council “fully 
informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.”17
                                                 
13 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1 (providing that “[n]othing in the present Charter precludes 
the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations”).  
14 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5.  
15 U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1.  
16 Id.   
17 U.N. Charter art. 54.  
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A more detailed discussion of the Group’s legal basis, examined in the context of 
its legal relationship with formal UN structures, can be found under each of the cases 
discussed in the sections that follow.   
 
II. THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CONTACT GROUP IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE 
 
A. Exploring the Past: Background, Context and Decision-making Processes   
 
The origins of the colonization process of Namibia, known at the time as South 
West Africa,18 go as far back as the 1880’s, when Germany began to colonize the 
territory.19 The territory remained under German control until after World War I, when, 
on June 28, 1919 Germany transferred title of the territory to the Allied and Associated 
States.  The Allied and Associated States subsequently transferred title to the League of 
Nations on the condition that Namibia enter the mandate system.20
In 1920, the League of Nations Council granted a class “C” mandate21 over South 
West Africa to Britain, which was to be exercised by South Africa on Britain’s behalf.22 
                                                 
18 South West Africa was acknowledged by the General Assembly with its new name of Namibia 
in 1968.  G.A. Res. 2372 (XXII), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16A, U.N. Doc. A/6716/Add. 1 (June 11, 1968).   
19 See RICHARD LEONARD, SOUTH AFRICA AT WAR 61 (1983).  
20 See Deneice C. Jordan-Walker, Settlement of the Namibian Dispute: The United States Role in 
Lieu of U.N. Sanctions, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 543, 551 (1982).   
21 Under the mandatory system, there were three types of mandates, designated as “A,” “B,” and 
“C” mandates. This differentiation was based on “[t]he stage of development of the people, the 
geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.”  League of 
Nations Covenant art. 22, para 3.   Class “A” mandates included communities formerly under Ottoman 
Empire, which have reached a stage of development where their independence can be provisionally 
recognized, subject to receiving further advices and assistance as far as they would be able to stand alone. 
The wishes of these peoples constituted the principal factor in the selection of a mandatory power. Class 
“B” mandates, which largely covered Central African peoples, provided that the mandatory power must be 
responsible for the administration of the territory, subject to guaranteeing freedom of conscience and 
religion, maintaining public order and morals, prohibiting abuses of the nature of slave trade, arms and 
liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of military and naval bases and/or of military training 
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South Africa was thus granted full power of administration over the territory, with the 
aim of promoting the well-being and development of the indigenous inhabitants of South 
West Africa.23  By accepting to serve as a Mandatory, South Africa accepted contingent 
obligations under international law, including the duty to submit to international 
supervision, the duty to submit annual reports on the administration of the mandate, and 
the duty to transmit petitions to the Security Council from the people of South West 
Africa.24    
Contrary to South Africa’s insistence to incorporate South West Africa into its 
own territory both at the time of the League of Nations and the United Nations,25 the 
international community consistently rejected such a proposal. Unable to reach a 
negotiated diplomatic solution, the General Assembly in Resolution 339 (IV) of 
December 1949 requested the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “the Court”) to 
give an advisory opinion on the legal status of South West Africa. The Court was 
unanimous in rejecting South Africa’s request to annex South West Africa, holding that 
South Africa did not possess the right to modify the international status of the territory of 
South West Africa without the consent of the UN.26 However, this did not prove to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the natives for purposes other than police functions and the defense of territory, as well as providing 
equal opportunities for the trade and commerce to other Members of the League. Under class “C” mandates 
were territories, such as South West Africa and certain islands in the South Pacific, which were 
characterized by either small seize of territory, sparseness of their population, or their contiguity to the 
territory of the mandatory power, or any other similar circumstances. Because of these reasons, it was 
considered that they can best be administered under the laws of the mandatory power, subject to the 
guarantees mentioned in other classes of mandates that could best benefit indigenous communities.  League 
of Nations Covenant art. 22, paras. 4-6.             
22 The Mandate for South West Africa, Terms of League of Nations Mandates, U.N. Doc. A/70, 
No. 10 (1940), reprinted in R.W. IMISHUE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 66-68 
(1965). 
23 International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 132. See also 
Jordan-Walker, supra note 20, at 552. 
24  International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 133, 136-37. 
25 See RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 62 (1986). See also Jordan-Walker, supra 
note 20, at 554-55.  
26 International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 144. 
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sufficient for terminating South Africa’s intention towards annexing the territory of South 
West Africa. Thus the UN had to proceed with further actions.  
The UN asserted the right to govern the territory of Namibia after the General 
Assembly terminated the mandatory power of South Africa and created  a UN Council 
for South West Africa. The General Assembly empowered the Council with the authority 
to carry out the functions of governance in the territory.27 However, South Africa 
declined to yield the territory of Namibia to UN administration. Although the Council 
was not yet in a position to directly and effectively administer the territory, it was 
nevertheless able to perform some of the administrative functions assigned to it through 
use of the United Nations Fund for Namibia.  Some of the activities carried out by the 
Council and financed by the UN Fund for Namibia included helping Namibian refugees, 
organizing training programs for Namibians, issuing travel documents, and establishing 
an emergency program of economic and technical assistance.28 Yet, the South African 
government continued to maintain its sovereign control over the territory.    
After the UN had terminated the mandate, the Security Council put forward a new 
initiative and requested an advisory opinion on the legal consequences for states of the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia.29 The ICJ held that the continued 
presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and called upon the South African 
government to immediately withdraw its administration and put an end to its occupation 
of the Namibian territory.30 The Court further held that Member States of the UN were 
under an obligation not to recognize the legality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia.31 
However, the South African government continued with its rejection policy of the 
validity of ICJ decisions, calling them “entirely untenable” and a “result of political 
                                                 
27 G.A. Res. 2248 (XXII), ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 5th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6657 (May 
19, 1967).
28 See AFRICA COMMITTEE, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A., ET AL., 
NAMIBIA: THE CRISIS IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA 13 (1983).  
29 S.C. Res. 284, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (July 27, 1970), http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/757/49/img/NR075749.pdf?OpenElement. 
30 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 15 (June 21, 1971).  
31 Id. 
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maneuvering instead of objective jurisprudence,” as well as its noncompliance trend 
concerning the decisions of other principal organs of the United Nations.32 A number of 
major world powers, most notably France and Great Britain, joined South Africa in its 
rejection policy by “refusing to accept those conclusions of the Court,” after considering 
them to be in conflict with their vital foreign policy interests.33 France and Great Britain 
were key trading partners of South Africa.  
After a relatively long period of continuous failures to resolve the Namibian knot 
through formal settings, most notably through the UN system, the next step was the shift 
to informal settings.34 It was in this context that the need for a more coherent and 
influential decision-making body emerged. This is how the Contact Group came into 
existence.         
 
 
B. The Role of the Contact Group in Namibia 
 
 1. Origin 
Originally, the Contact Group was created as part of a private initiative by a group 
of Western States (Britain, Canada, France, the United States, and West Germany), 
intending to overcome the failed efforts of the UN in the Namibia negotiations. The 
Group’s existence was formally declared on April 10, 1978, when it submitted a proposal 
for a Namibian settlement to the UN Security Council.35 The proposal, which was 
                                                 
32 Hofmann, Vorster Rejects Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1971, at A3, col. 5.  See also U.N. 
SCOR, 31st Sess., Supp. 1 for Jan.-Mar. 1976, at 39, U.N. Doc. S/11948 (1976); Jordan-Walker, supra note 
20, at 559. 
33 Lisa Stearns, The Dilemma of Struggle through the International Order, 11 INT’L J. SOC. L. 65, 
73 (1983) 
34 For a thorough discussion of the decision-making process in institutionalized and non-
institutionalized settings, see Siegfried Wiessner, International Law in the 21st Century: Decision Making 
in Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Settings, 23 THESAURUS ACROASIUM 137 (1997).    
35 See U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June 1978, at 17, U.N. Doc. S/12636 (1978). 
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accepted by both South Africa and South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), 
eventually formed the basis of Security Council Resolution 435.36  
 
 2. Aims 
The main goal of the Contact Group was to facilitate Namibian independence in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution 385 of January 30, 1976. As stated in the 
Contact Group’s proposal of April 10, 1978 to the Security Council, the Group members 
consulted with various actors involved in the Namibian question “with a view to 
encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent 
government in accordance with resolution 385 (1976).”37 Resolution 385 reiterated the 
Security Council’s “demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the 
withdrawal, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 
366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to 




3. Legal Authority  
In its initial phase, the Contact Group operated outside United Nations authority 
and held separate negotiations with the involved parties outside UN auspices. In a wide 
and implicit interpretation of its text, Security Council Resolution 431 could be one 
possible source upon which to base the formal authority of the Contact Group. This 
statement can be deduced from the formulation of Resolution 431, which states that 
Security Council “tak[es] note of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation 
…”39  
                                                 
36 S.C. Res. 435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435 (Sept. 29, 1978). 
37 Letter from the Representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of 
the Security Council, 33 U.N. SCOR Supp. for Apr.-June 1978, at 17, U.N. Doc. S/12636 (Apr. 10, 1978).   
38 S.C. Res. 385, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/30 (Jan. 30, 1976). 
39 S.C. Res. 431, supra note 7.  
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“Taking note” does not mean “recognizing.” However, the fact that the Council 
has considered the proposal and has taken note of it means that the proposal has 
automatically received some form of recognition as authoritative. In this sense, one may 
argue for an implicit recognition of the Contact Group. Yet, this also illustrates that the 
Group has not received any formal mandate or delegation of powers to negotiate within 
the normal processes of the UN.  
A phase of clarity came with the adoption of Resolution 435 of September 
1978,40 where the Security Council approved the Secretary-General’s preceding report on 
the transition process.41 This included the formation and guidelines of operation for the 
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which were proposed by the 
Contact Group for settlement of the Namibian question. To this effect, the Secretary-
General provided in his report on the implementation of Resolutions 435 and 439 that, 
“[i]n agreeing to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), the 
parties have agreed to abide by those provisions,”42 and that in case “[t]he 
implementation of the Proposal be jeopardized as a result of the failure of any party to 
carry out its provisions, I would bring the matter immediately to the attention of the 
Security Council.”43  
The Secretary-General’s recognition of the Contact Group Proposal and its 
approval by the Security Council provided ex post facto approval to the activities of the 
Contact Group. In the alternative, the Group operated within the framework of the UN 
intended goals as outlined in Security Council Resolution 385, which helped to further 
the achievement of such goals.           
 
 4. Effectiveness  
                                                 
40 S.C. Res. 435, supra note 36.  
41 See Report by the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council 
resolution 435 (1978), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/12903 (1978).  
42 Report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 
435 (1978) and 439 (1978), U.N. Doc. S/13120 (1979).  
43 Id. 
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The Contact Group, however, neither brought about Namibian independence nor 
was it the final regime to bring about the solution to the Namibian question. With a 
change in the U.S. executive administration, the Group effectively dissolved, which in 
turn led to a change of American policy towards southern Africa.44 The Reagan 
administration and the South African government conditioned Namibian independence 
on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This so-called “linkage” policy seems to 
have also been the reason for France’s withdrawal from the Contact Group and ultimately 
the termination of the Group’s operation.45 France suspended its membership in the 
Group on December 7, 1983, but it maintained its support for Resolution 435. In absence 
of the Contact Group’s multilateral approach, the United States took over leadership. In 
December 1988, the Contact Group finally reached an agreement that was signed by 
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa at UN Headquarters. This agreement was decisive for 
the implementation of the settlement plan.46  
In terms of its overall contribution, the Group’s role decisively gave new impulse 
to the diplomatic impasse that had surrounded the UN-led negotiations. Its proposal, 
submitted to the Security Council, became the guiding light in the process of Namibian 
independence. Although the Group operated independently of the United Nations system, 
its objectives were in concordance with the framework of objectives as stipulated in 
Security Council Resolution 385. As stated by former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez 
de Cuéllar, the Contact Group and the United Nations were “working separately but 
within the framework of objectives defined by the UN Security Council.”47 In addition, 
the Contact Group informed the UN Secretary-General throughout the negotiation 
process.48      
                                                 
44 See Margaret P. Karns, Ad Hoc Multilateral Diplomacy: The United States, the Contact Group, 
and Namibia, 41 INT’L ORG. 93, 112-14 (1987). 
45 Id. at 114-16. 
46 See Jochen Prantl and Jean Krasno, Informal Ad Hoc Groupings of States and the Workings of 
the United Nations, 3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS OCCASIONAL 
PAPERS 30 (2002).    
47 JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, PILGRIMAGE FOR PEACE. A SECRETARY-GENERAL’S MEMOIR 320 
(1997). 
48 Jochen Prantl and Jean Krasno, supra note 46, at 31.  
 7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 129
As expected, the Group had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, 
the Group’s advantages mainly concern some of the inadequacies that characterized the 
UN system of conflict settlement, i.e. bureaucracy, lack of information, state sovereignty 
concerns, lack of coordinated efforts and of enforcement powers. On the other hand, the 
UN is well-equipped with legality, and to a certain extent, credibility, which is what the 
Contact Group lacked. Thus, the ideal format of a conflict resolution body would need to 
possess such fundamental features as legality, credibility, and effectiveness.  
 
 
III. BACK ON THE SCENE: MEDIATING THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
A. Origin and Context 
 The re-emergence of the Contact Group in another conflict, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was again due to  largely inadequate and unsuccessful diplomatic efforts by 
formal structures such as the EU49 and the UN.50 As one author put it, the creation of the 
Contact Group came in response to the “frustration and the belated realization that 
nothing useful could be achieved while the major powers pushed moderately different 
policies.”51 In other words, its creation was conditioned by “unproductive sets of 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations of the outsiders involved in working out an 
undeclared agenda,”52 if there was an agenda at all.     
The Group declared its existence on April 19, 1994 and held its first ministerial 
meeting one week later in London. The idea for the Group as an alternative diplomatic 
tool for the Bosnian conflict was first discussed between the co-chairmen of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), David Owen and Thorvald 
                                                 
49 For a detailed discussion of the EU mediating efforts in the Balkans region, see DAVID OWEN, 
BALKAN ODYSSEY (1995). 
50 Concerning international mediation efforts in Bosnia, see Nimet Beriker Atiyos, Mediating 
Regional Conflict and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia Herzegovina, ANN. AM. ACADEMY 
OF POL. & SOC. SC. (1995).    
51  Thomas Halverson, American Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
YUGOSLAV CRISIS 22 (Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson eds. 1996).  
52 See Nimet Beriker Atiyos, supra note 50, at 201. 
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Stoltenberg, and the representatives of the United States. The initiative came at a time 
when the United States was showing a greater willingness to get involved in the 
diplomatic process, which had been frozen a year earlier. The Group brought together 
key global actors that shared certain strategic interests and could influence the outcome 
of the process. The Group was composed of France, Germany, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, and served the purpose of coordinating the separate 
diplomatic efforts of the European Union, Russia, and the United States. At the outset, 
the Group was formally referred to as the representatives of the UN, the EU, the United 
States, and the Russian Federation. This reference can be found in two of the Security 
Council resolutions, adopted after the formation of the Group. Security Council 
Resolution 942, for instance, expressed its appreciation “for the efforts undertaken by the 
representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America, 
and the Russian Federation to assist the parties in reaching a settlement.”53 The 
subsequent resolution of the same day used the same language.54  
 
B. Structure  
Membership and composition of this Contact Group reflects at least three 
underlying principles: the permanent members of the Security Council serving in the 
Contact Group are the Groups most powerful members; membership of non-permanent 
states depends on a concordance of their interests with those of the Security Council 
permanent members; and the relationship of the (possible) Contact Group members with 
the parties involved in the dispute is an important factor when states consider whether to 
join the Group.  
Four out of the five members (France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) occupy permanent seats in the Security Council. One of them, Russia, had 
the additional role of influencing the Serbian party, given their historic ties.55 Germany’s 
                                                 
53  S.C. Res. 942, U.N. Doc. S/RES/942 (Sept. 23, 1994). 
54  S.C. Res. 943, U.N. Doc. S/RES/943 (Sept. 23, 1994).  
55 On the genesis of the Group and the functions and relationship between its members, see 
generally LEONARD J. COHEN, BROKEN BONDS: YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION AND BALKAN POLITICS IN 
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presence in the Group may be explained because of its relations with one of the parties in 
Bosnian conflict, the Croats, and because of the policy interests it shared with the United 
States.56
 
C. Authority  
The Contact Group’s efforts were explicitly recognized by the Security Council 
with its approval of the Contacts Group’s territorial approach as a basis for political 
settlement  in the first two operative paragraphs of Resolution 942: 
1. Expresses its approval of the proposed territorial settlement for the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been put to the 
Bosnian parties as part of an overall peace settlement; 
2. Expresses its satisfaction that the proposed territorial settlement has 
now been accepted in full by all except the Bosnian Serb 
party.57(Emphasis added). 
In a later section of the same resolution, the Security Council strongly condemned “the 
Bosnian Serb party for their refusal to accept the proposed territorial settlement,”58 and 
demanded that the party “accept this settlement unconditionally and in full.”59  
The Council also explicitly recognized and supported the Contact Group peace 
plan for Bosnia in a number of subsequent resolutions. Resolution 959 reiterated “the 
importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious 
centre,”60 and noted “in this context the positive contribution that agreement between the 
parties on the demilitarization of Sarajevo could make to this end, to the restoration of 
normal life in Sarajevo, and to achieving an overall settlement, consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
TRANSITION 310 (2nd ed. 1995); LEO TINDEMANS ET AL (EDS.), UNFINISHED PEACE: REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BALKANS 47 (1996).  
56 Greece, which held the EU Presidency at the time, did not become a member because its policy 
interest diverged with those of the United States.  See DAVID OWEN, supra note 49, at 365. 
57 S.C. Res. 942, supra note 53, ¶¶ 1, 2.  
58 Id. at ¶ 3. 
59 Id.  
60 S.C. Res. 959, U.N. Doc. S/RES/959 (Nov. 19, 1994). 
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Contact Group peace plan.”61 Resolution 982 also welcomed “the efforts of Member 
States, in particular those of the Contact Group,”62 and emphasized “the utmost 
importance of the work of the Contact Group in the overall peace process in the area.”63 
Resolution 987 noted again “the need for resumed negotiations aimed at an overall 
peaceful settlement of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 
basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting- point.”64 Moreover, 
other UN bodies, such as the General Assembly, recognized and endorsed the Contact 
Group’s peace plan and any necessary additional action. In Resolution 49/10, the General 
Assembly endorsed “the peace proposal of the Contact Group as outlined by the 
communiqué of Foreign Ministers of 30 July 1994, including the decisions taken by the 
Contact Group regarding further actions in the event of a rejection of the proposed peace 
plan.”65    
 
D. Aims and Outcomes: Between Unity and Effectiveness    
The underlying principle of the Bosnian Contact Group was the maintenance of 
the unity of the Group. Its declared aim, as Pauline Neville-Jones articulates it, was to 
“establish an informal but strong policy-making core around which the main international 
players could unite.”66  
While the Group in large part managed to maintain its functional unity until a 
solution was found to the Bosnian conflict, the internal relations of the Group were often 
characterized by divisions. However, the Group was primarily interested in keeping, or at 
least showing in public, its unity, at all costs, even by sacrificing much of its 
effectiveness in conflict resolution. As an author put it, “although the Group managed to 
                                                 
61 Id.  
62 S.C. Res. 982, U.N. Doc. S/RES/982 (Mar. 31, 1995).  
63 Id. 
64 S.C. Res. 987, U.N. Doc. S/RES/987 (Apr. 19, 1995). 
65 G.A. Res. 49/10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/10 (Nov. 8, 1994).
66 Pauline Neville-Jones, Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia, SURVIVAL, vol. 38, No. 
4, 44, at 46 (Winter 1996-97).  
 7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 133
hold together, publicly at least, the effort to do so meant that the maintenance of unity, 
rather than conflict resolution, became its priority.”67      
 
 
IV. STRUGGLING WITH THE STATUS OF KOSOVO: FROM AN INTERIM PEACE ACCORD 
TO A FINAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
 
A. Pre-Conflict Kosovo Initiatives  
 
1. Context  
As in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Namibia, the Contact Group on 
Kosovo played a key role in the process of finding an interim peaceful settlement and is 
now playing a role in the process of finding a final political settlement to the question of 
the status of Kosovo; a role as crucial as its role in the pre-conflict period. The Group’s 
activities concerning Kosovo emerged amid growing international concerns following the 
escalation of violence as a result of systematic repression of the majority ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo by the Serbian regime. Until 1996, the Albanians led a peaceful 
struggle. Many Kosovar Albanians, however, were growing impatient with the passive 
non-violent policy advocated by their elected leader, Ibrahim Rugova, a French-educated 
Professor of Literature. Additionally, Kosovar Albanians were disappointed that the 
Dayton Peace Accords did not address the issue of Kosovo.  
The Contact Group on Kosovo is a continuation of the Group on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The first statements concerning the situation in Kosovo came from the 
Contact Group on Bosnia at a meeting held in New York in September 1997. The Group 
stressed its deep concern over the escalation of violence in Kosovo and called for a 
dialogue between the parties in conflict.68 It further voiced its concern at two other 
meetings, the Peace Implementation Conference in Bonn (Dec. 9-10, 1997) and the 
                                                 
67 Helen Leigh-Phippard, The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia, 53 INT’L J. 306, 319 (1997-
1998).   
68 See Office of the High Representative, Bosnia Contact Group Statement on Kosovo (Sept. 24, 
1997), http://www.ohr.int/docu/d9709044.htm.  
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Contact Group meeting of January 8, 1998, but without any practical effect. Stronger 
measures, however, were introduced following the Drenica massacre. On March 9, 1998, 
the Group called for the implementation of an arms embargo against Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) and a ban the on transfer of equipment that could be used for the 
suppression of Kosovar Albanians.69 These measures eventually formed the content of 
Security Council Resolution 1160, which imposed an arms embargo on the FRY and 
called for a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration 
in Kosovo.70 By April 1998 the Group had announced additional measures, including a 
freeze on FRY funds held abroad.71   
 
2. Structure  
Membership in the Group remained the same except for the addition of Italy, 
which joined the Contact Group as holder of the EU Presidency in 1996. Italy managed to 
remain a member of the Contact Group even after its EU Presidency term had expired; 
partly due to its reluctance to leave the Group and, to a certain extent, due to the pressure 
it was able to exert on other influential members of the Group, most notably the United 
States. While holder of the EU Presidency, Italy regularly threatened to forbid the 
deployment of American Stealth Bombers from Italian air bases.72  
Despite commonalities that exist between the Contact Groups on Bosnia and 
Kosovo, such as geographic location, formerly being part of the same federation, and 
dealing with the same leadership (i.e. Belgrade regime), a few differences should be 
noted. Procedurally, there is a new member in the Contact Group on Kosovo, Italy. 
Substantively, while the Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina aimed at stopping the 
bloodshed by mediating a territorial-based settlement for Bosnia, the Contact Group on 
Kosovo had to both mediate an end to the conflict and find a political settlement on the 
                                                 
69 See London Contact Group Statement on Kosovo (Mar. 9, 1998), 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/travels/980309_kosovo.html.   
70 S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998). 
71 See Contact Group Joint Statement: Kosovo, ¶ 8 (June 12, 1998), 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm980612_2.htm.   
72 See CARL BILDT, PEACE JOURNEY: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA 101 (1998). 
 7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 135
status of the territory. Another important difference is the demographic structure of the 
territories; while the population of Kosovo is predominantly ethnic Albanians, Bosnia’s 
demographic structure is far more complex and heterogeneous.  
 
3. Aims 
The original political aim of the Contact Group was to negotiate an interim 
solution that would bring an end to hostilities between the parties and restore the 
autonomy and the self-administration of Kosovo until a final settlement could be found. 
This aim was presented in the Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and 
Self-Government in Kosovo,73 but the Serbian delegation refused to sign the Accords. On 
March 23, 1999, after a final diplomatic effort by US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in 
Belgrade failed,  NATO launched a military operation against FRY.  
A new set of principles was subsequently established in order to bring the conflict 
to an end. An international team of mediators headed by former Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari, in his capacity as the EU envoy, and including an American envoy, the former 
Under-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and a Russian envoy, the former Prime Minister 
Victor Chernomyrdin, eventually reached an agreement with Belgrade regime. The 
principles of the agreement drew substantially on a statement of principles previously 
agreed to by the G-8 Foreign Ministers and were included as annexes to Security Council 
Resolution 1244.74          
 
4. Authority     
As previously mentioned, the Contact Group on Kosovo is best described as a 
continuation of the Contact Group on Bosnia, which is why some authors refer to it as 
“the Balkans Contact Group.”75 In this respect, there is no explicit prior legal 
                                                 
73 Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 
1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/99648_1.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords]. 
74  S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
75 E.g., Michael J. Kelly, Traveling the Road to Rambouillet: Is the Imposition of Federalism in 
Kosovo Pragmatic Foreign Policy or Unwise Meddling? 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 789, 792 (1999).   
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authorization or special procedure of legitimization of the Contact Group’s activities. As 
with the other cases discussed above, however, its policies and activities have acquired 
subsequent recognition in Security Council resolutions. Security Council Resolution 1160 
noted “with appreciation the statements of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, 
Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 9 and 25 March 1998 … 
including the proposal on a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo.”76 Resolution 1199 also noted with “appreciation the 
statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America 
(the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion of the Contact Group’s meeting 
with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan … and the further statement of the 
Contact Group made in Bonn on 8 July 1998.”77  
In contrast to the pre-conflict period, there have been no Security Council 
resolutions authorizing or recognizing the functioning of the Group and its leading role in 
framing the future status of Kosovo. The Group has rather acquired its legitimization 
through the participation of, and the coordination of its policies with, the UN Mission in 
Kosovo and the UN designated envoys and representatives.78    
 5. Outcomes: Political Effectiveness vs. Unity   
As can be seen from other cases, unity within the Contact Group is essential in 
order for it to achieve the intended results. Despite difficulties in the process, which may 
be quite normal in complex conflict situations, the Group was able to maintain its unity in 
the case of Bosnia. Contrary to the case of Bosnia, where the Contact Group was 
interested in the maintenance of the unity of the Group at all costs, the Contact Group on 
Kosovo has risked the unity of the Group by sacrificing the interests of its members. The 
Group favored NATO air strikes against FRY instead of preserving their cooperation 
with one of the members, the Russian Federation. As a result of this, the Contact Group 
did not meet again until after the post-conflict period, except at an unofficial meeting 
                                                 
76 S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 70. 
77 S.C. Res. 1199,  U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept 23, 1998).   
78  See  Contact Group statements in supra notes 3, 4, 8, and 9.   
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convened during the NATO air strikes on April 7, 1999 in Brussels that did not result 
with any official declaration or statement. The Group’s life, however, continued, as it 
assumed a crucial role in the post-conflict period. 
 
B. Post-Conflict Activation  
 
The Contact Group on Kosovo re-emerged in the post-conflict period in response 
to the violence of March 2004 and coordinated Kosovo policy with the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).79 Its representatives have met 
regularly to monitor the situation on the ground. It supports UNMIK and the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) by urging Kosovo’s leadership to continue to repair any damage 
caused by the March violence and by monitoring Kosovo’s progress in the process of 
implementing UN-endorsed standards.80
Recently, the Group has played a leading role in the process of finding a political 
settlement to the issue of Kosovo’s status. Whether the Group will manage to keep its 
unity until the end of the process or whether it will once again fail to keep its unity due to 
Russia’s position remains to be seen. However, several important developments have 
already come out of the Contract Group. The most important these are the core principles, 
which articulated the Contact Group’s position and aims concerning Kosovo’s future 
political status (although these principles are not without the ambiguities that typically 
surround complex territorial disputes). 
The first attempt of the Group towards providing a general framework for a 
political settlement resulted in the Guiding Principles of November 2005, which 
reminded the parties that there should be “no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, 
                                                 
79 See Joint Statement of the Contact Group on Kosovo, supra note 9. The Group provided in its 
statement: “Meeting in Pristina for the first time, the Contact Group declares its intention to step up its 
engagement in Kosovo. The Contact Group will meet periodically in Pristina and actively support the work 
of UNMIK, KFOR and the PISG and intends to foster enhanced cooperation among them. … We are 
meeting in the shadow of violent attacks on people and property in Kosovo…” 
80 On Standards Implementation, see UNMIK, Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (Mar. 31, 
2004), http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/ksip_eng.pdf#search=%22Kosovo%20Standards%22 (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2006). 
 7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 138
no partition of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or any other  country.” 81 The 
Contact Group Ministers re-stated the international community’s “willingness to 
establish, for an interim period after a settlement is reached, appropriate international 
civilian and military structures to help ensure compliance with the settlement’s 
provisions.”82 In a policy statement in January 2006, the Group further articulated its 
position by making explicit, for the first time, the principle that any solution to the status 
of Kosovo must “be acceptable to the people of Kosovo,”83 while acknowledging that 
“disastrous policies of the past lie at the heart of the current problems.”84 Meeting at a 
ministerial level, the Group recalled that “the character of the Kosovo problem, shaped 
by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and consequent conflicts, ethnic cleansing and the 
events of 1999, and the extended period of international administration under UNSCR 
1244, must be fully taken into account in settling Kosovo’s status.”85 Another core 
principle advanced by the Group provided that “a multi-ethnic settlement is the only 
workable option and that the more the vital interests of minorities are addressed the 
quicker a broadly acceptable agreement can be reached.”86 The Contact Group statement 
of July 24, 2006 reaffirmed the principles that the settlement should be “acceptable to the 
people of Kosovo and promotes a multi-ethnic society with a future for all of its 
citizens.”87
The Group again refined its position in a recent statement issued after a 
ministerial meeting in New York chaired by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. 
It provided, in relevant part, that “Ministers support the Special Envoy’s efforts to work 
with the parties in cooperation with the Contact Group to arrive at a realistic outcome that 
enhances regional stability, is acceptable to the people of Kosovo and preserves Kosovo’s 
                                                 
81 Guiding Principles, supra note 3. 
82 Id. 
83 See Statement by the Contact Group on the Future of Kosovo (Jan. 31, 2006), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/62459.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006). 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 High-Level Meeting on the Future Status of Kosovo, supra note 9. 
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multi-ethnic character.”88 These statements demonstrate that the Contact Group attaches 
great importance to three fundamental principles: acceptance of the settlement by the 
people of Kosovo, strong guarantees for protection of minorities, and regional stability. 
The first two principles would, as stated by the Contact Group, “immeasurably enhance 
regional stability,”89 and a settlement itself would further contribute to regional stability. 
As stated by the Contact Group on July 24, 2006, “a status settlement in Kosovo will 
enhance regional stability”90 by removing the “destabilizing political and economic 
effects of continuing uncertainty over Kosovo’s future status.”91
 
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE GLOBAL COMMON 
INTEREST 
 
The cases discussed above reveal the complementary role of the Contact Group 
and the Security Council in conflict mediation and resolution. The effectiveness of an 
informal grouping, characterized by influence, power, and persuasion, permits the 
support of a formal executive body, such as the Security Council. This support adds 
credibility and legality to the informality of a Group. Additionally, the Contact Group 
does not operate illegally, even though its initial involvement may be described as having 
an extra-legal character. A unique feature of the Group is its lack of a single prescribed 
source of authority. Its legal authority is grounded on a range of sources that are 
manifested in a variety of ways. 
The flexibility and plurality of the UN Charter allows for a mixture of authority 
concerning the role of member states and regional or other international groupings in 
conflict mediation and resolution. The role taken on by member states and groupings can 
manifest itself in a variety of ways. 
Groups, by themselves, may assist the UN by dealing with matters related to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, provided that their assistance is 
                                                 
88 Kosovo Contact Group Ministerial Statement, supra note 4. 
89 Statement by the Contact Group on the Future of Kosovo, supra note 83. 
90 High-Level Meeting on the Future Status of Kosovo, supra note 9. 
91 Id. 
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consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.92 Groups may also 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by making its assistance 
directly available to the Security Council.93  This type of assistance may take the form of 
an operation taken within the outlined goals of UN formal bodies, such as the Security 
Council,94 or a continuation of operations of a previously established Group in a 
subsequent crisis or in a geographically contingent territory.95  
Beyond the flexible language of the Charter, authority for a Group may arise from 
explicit or implicit authorization and recognition by the Security Council. This 
authorization may create the Group and authorize its subsequent actions or it may consist 
of ex post facto approval of a Group’s actions.96  Finally, legitimization of the actions of 
the Group may come merely from UN participation in the process.97   
The necessity of resorting to such an informal body will depend in large part on 
the reform process and effectiveness of the United Nations system, most notably the 
Security Council in its capacity as an executive body. An increase in the number of the 
state actors involved, however, either within the Contact Group or the Security Council, 
will not necessarily bring about greater efficiency.98 An alternative might be to ensure a 
higher degree of transparency with regards to the Group’s and Council’s debates and 
deliberations99 and to consult substantially and comply with the wishes of those most 
                                                 
92 U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1. 
93 U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1.  
94 An example may be S.C. Res. 385, supra note 38.  See also discussion on the Legality Authority 
of the Namibian Contact Group  supra Part II.B.3. 
95 See e.g., discussion on Bosnia supra Part III.  
96 See, e.g., discussion on Namibia supra Part II.  
97 See discussion on the Contact Group’s authority in post-conflict Kosovo supra Part IV.  
98 See, e.g., EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS: 1919-1939, 29 (2nd ed. 1945) 
(stating that “[t]he Council, in becoming more ‘representative,’ lost much of its effectiveness as a political 
instrument. Reality was sacrificed to an abstract principle.”). See also W. Michael Reisman, The 
Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 83, 96 (1993) (noting that “[e]xpansion of 
the Council would be unlikely to satisfy those agitating for change, yet it would make the Council more 
unwieldy and less efficient”). 
99 See Jochen Prantl and Jean Krasno, supra note 46, at 34 (noting the increase in number of 
closed sessions within the Security Council). The authors state that “[u]ntil 2000, the number of informal 
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affected by its decisions. This would result in a sense of legitimacy born out of both the 
transparency and empirical needs and wants of the affected community. In this respect, 
the ultimate aim should be to act in a manner that preserves intrinsic human values, 
which would in turn contribute to the maximization of the realization of these values.  
Just as important would be the creation of an improved, more coherent, better 
coordinated, and effective UN system for conflict mediation and settlement. A new 
commission or council within the UN system with the purpose of mediating and settling 
conflicts could serve that purpose. As an alternative, any informal ad hoc grouping of 
states could include a representative of the United Nations. 
All in all, as long as there exists a Security Council that fails to act adequately or 
in a timely manner, or continues to make use of veto even in matters related to human 
concerns or the common interest, and thus is unable to properly allocate its indispensable 
functions in the global community and make effective use of its power on a global scale, 
any other alternative legal and policy instrument which is in a position to exercise such 
functions in an authoritative and controlling manner100 and is accepted as such by those 
affected by its decisions, should act. Whatever the inadequacies of such ad hoc extra-
legal grouping may be, a relatively unified, influential, and globally representative body 
has, to a certain degree, an empirical advantage in effectuating its decisions and 
                                                                                                                                                 
consultations clearly outweighed the formal meetings, with the gap slowly closing, given the increased 
number of public debates and opening meetings of the Security Council at the end of the decade. While the 
Council held 55 formal meetings and 62 consultations in 1988, adopting 20 resolutions and eight 
presidential statements, these numbers increased to 135 meetings and 251 consultations in 1995, with 66 
resolutions and 63 statements… From 1991 onwards, the number of informal consultations had increased 
much faster than the number of formal meetings. The high point was reached in 1994, when the Security 
Council convened 165 formal meetings but closed the doors 273 times for informal consultations.” Id.  See 
also Siegfried Wiessner, supra note 34, at 153 (stating that “[t]he great bulk of … work occurs in 
environments other than formal dispute settlement. The roles of actors in these settings are essentially 
different and less restricted.”).     
100 For an innovative and lucid analysis of the distinction and intersection between “authority” and 
“control,” see HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1950); Myres S. 
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 32 
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (1959); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World 
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 LEGAL ED. 253 (1967).   
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considering their political and moral consequences more easily and efficiently. Any 
decision-making process should, however, be in full harmony with a public order in 
which the human values that individuals desire most are widely shaped and shared: a 
system that promotes and protects a higher level of freedoms, rights, and values in the 
interest of individuals rather than in the state. Utilizing Nietzsche’s statement on the 
“falseness of an opinion,” the answer to the justification of informality raised in the 
context of the Contact Group would be: “[it] is not for us any objection to it… [t]he 
question is how far it is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps 
species-creating.”101   
 
                                                 
101 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (trans. Helen Zimmern), ch. 1 (1989).  
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